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POSSIBLE U. S. SLCM NEGOTIATING OPTIONS

John J. Ballantine
Ethan S. Burger
TITAN Systems, Inc.
6833 Beverly Road
McLean, VA 22101

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This study identifies and evaluates five possible mechanisms for including the sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) in the arms control process. It focuses on limits for deployed SLCMs. It does not deal with possible constraints on non-deployed SLCMs either in storage or undergoing final assembly. Other related issues such as the reloadability of SLCM launchers and non-U.S. NATO platforms are also discussed.

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CHAPTER 1



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM

The U.S. cruise missile program has been one of the more nettlesome atms control issues since the Vladivostok Accord in 1974. For the Soviets, the cruise missile represented another attempt by the U.S. to exploit a unique technological capability to achieve military superiority over the U.S.S.R. The U.S., on the other hand, saw the cruise missile program evolve from the category of a SALT "bargaining chip" to an integral part of both its strategic and theater force postures.

In Europe, the cruise missile has become a mainstay of the U.S./NATO nuclear force modernization effort. Its value at sea has recently been demonstrated by the Falkland Islands crisis. Clearly, the cruise missile is a versatile weapon system capable of performing a number of missions, both nuclear and non-nuclear, very well.

The potential military value of the cruise missile to the U.S. (and Soviet Union) is evident. What is not clear is how such a weapon system would be integrated into a theater arms control framework. This is particularly true for the sea-launched variant, the SLCM. For example, a number of questions about limitations on SLCM range, armament, and platform must be considered. This draft report presents the results of TITAN Systems, Inc.'s research to date on possible SLCM negotiating options for the U.S. This study was prepared for the Defense Nuclear Agency and the Nuclear Negotiations Branch (OP-652) of the U.S. Navy.

SCOPE

This study identifies and evaluates five possible mechanisms for including the sea-launched cruise missile in the arms control process. It iccuses on limits for deployed SLCMs. It does not deal with possible constraints on non-deployed SLCMs either in storage or undergoing final assembly.



^{*} SLCM has three variants at present: (1) land-attack nuclear, (2) land-attack conventional, and (3) anti-ship.

The cutoff date for the information used in this study is May 1983.

1.3 FINDINGS

1. In the Soviet view, a cruise missile (SLCM or GLCM) deployment without a strict range limitation poses an everpresent danger to Soviet strategic targets.



2. A number of important issues about SLCM will have to be addressed before an agreement can be reached.

Some of the more salient points that will have to be addressed include the following:

• An agreed-upon range definition for a long- and short-range SLCM.




• Reload capability of SLCM launchers.



• Surface-to-surface capable anti-submarine warfare (ASW) missiles.



NATO/Warsaw Pact SLCM platforms.



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
CHAPTER 2

SLCM IN THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS

The cruise missile first became an issue at the Vladivostok Summit in 1974. Since then, it has remained a bone of contention between Moscow and Washington. For the Soviets, the sea- and ground-launched (GLCM) variants seemed to be the source of greatest concern. Nonetheless, no real agreement has yet been reached on either of these two variants, although the GLCM is currently being considered in the Intermediate Range Nuclear (INF) talks. This chapter discusses five possible options for limiting the sea-launched cru se missile in an arms control framework. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first discusses the Soviet concern about the cruise missile in general. The second addresses issues involved in bringing SLCM into an arms control framework. And, the third discusses the five possible negotiating options.

2.1 SOVIET CONCERN OVER THE CRUISE MISSILE

The Soviets have sought through arms control provisions to place strict limitations on air-, sea-, and ground-launched cruise missiles. The SALT II negotiations provided ample evidence of this fact. In particular, the Soviets seemed to be most preoccupied with the SLCM and GLCM. Their cause for concern was threefold: (1) the cruise missile's accuracy and yield clearly put it into the category of a counterforce weapon, (2) the deployment of the SLCM and GLCM would likely alter the existing Eurostrategic and strategic balances in the U.S. favor, and (3) these missiles could decidedly change the escalation process.




^{*} The Pershing II is of equal concern to the Soviets.

for making strikes at vitally important Soviet strategic objectives in the western regions of the U.S.S.k., reckoning in this way to reduce the Soviet Union's ability to act in response to U.S. aggression.... It is clear that this alters the strategic situation, increases the danger of war for the United States and breaches the balance between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

This Soviet preoccupation with the first strike potential of the cruise missile, particularly SLCM, has been voiced a number of times in recent months. One Soviet military analyst noted, for example, that U.S. battleships armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles


are essentially being allocated the role of carriers of additional forward-based systems. The fact that this is, in point of fact, a matter of increasing first-strike potential is actually admitted in U.S. military circles. The American naval journal United States Naval Institute Proceedings pointed out that the installation of cruise missiles on battleships could destabilize Soviet-American arms control accords.*

In the Soviet view, these new systems would probably also change the escalation process. The Soviets have always maintained that a nuclear war in Europe would probably escalate to all-out nuclear war. But hey appear to be particularly concerned that the cruise missile (SLCM and GLCM) would erase any escalation boundaries or firebreaks that now exist (if, in fact, any do exist) "between strategic and tactical weaponry, and [that these systems] would facilitate the lowering of the 'nuclear threshold' and increase the risk of nuclear war."



^{*} Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Soviet Union Daily Report, 21 January 1983, p. AA-13.

^{**} The SLCM is more flexible than GLCM in this regard. The decision to launch SLCM would rest with the U.S., thereby circumventing the potential problem of host country approval.




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For the purp ses of this study, a SLCM was considered accountable (or limited) as a long-range system if it is capable of a range of 200 km or greater. Two hundred kilometers seems to be a reasonable compromise between a "tactical" and a "long-range" mission for the SLCM. Tactical here is defined as a system capable only of line-of-sight acquisition and intercept. It is range refers to an over-the-horizon acquisition and intercept capability. A summary of some of the U.S. and Soviet SLCM systems that would be affected to this definition is presented in Table 2.


In addition to a range definition, other important questions about SLCM will have to be addressed before an agreement can be reached. Seven issues have been identified thus far. A brief summary of each issue is presented below.

2.2.1 Reload Capability of SLCM Launchers



^{*} The VLS can also launch Harpoon and the Standard missile.

Table 2. Soviet and U.S. Surface-to-Surface Missiles




ASW weapon with surface-to-surface capability. Projected.


Source: DIA, Aerodynamic Missile Handbook, U.S.S.R./China 1982.

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
Interchangeability of Missiles with Launchers



Surface-to-Surface Capable Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM) 2.2.3



Surface-to-Surface Capable Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Missiles




The Standard is still capable of being used as a surface-to-surface

The SS-N-15 is similar to the U.S. SUBROC. Both the SUBROC and ASROC will be phased out in the mid-1980s. Page 15 is deleted.

Table 3. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Short-Range (< 200 km) SLCM Platforms (1982)

Country	Class	No. of Hulls	Launcher Type	Missile Range (km)
Bulgaria	OSA I	3	4 single SS-N-2B/C	40 or 80
	OSA II	1	4 single SS-N-2B/C	40 or 80
German Democratic Republic	OSA I	15	4 single SS-N-2B/C	40 or 80
Poland	OSA	13	4 single SS-N-2B/C	40 or 80
Romania	OSA	5	4 single SS-N-2B/C	40 or 80

Reference: Military Balance 1982/83, Air Force Magazine, Volume 65, No. 12, December 1982.



Country	Class	No. of Hulls	Launcher Type	Missile Range (km)
belgium	E-71 Frigate	4	4 Exocet	40-70
Britain	County Destroyer	3	4 Exocet	40-70
	Type 22 Frigate	4	4 Exocet	40-70
	Type 21 Frigate	6	4 Exocet	40-70
	Leander Frigate	18	4 Exocet	40-70
Denmark	Frigate Willemoes Fast	5	2 Quad Harpoon	100
	Attack Craft (FAC)	10	l Harpoon	100
west Germany	Hamburg Destroyer	4	4 Exocet	40-70
	Bremen Frigate	1	2 Quad Harpson	100
	Type 143 FAC	10	4 Exocet	40-70
	Type 148 FAC	20	4 Exocet	40-70
Greese	Kortenaer Frigate	1	2 Quad Harpoon	100
	LaCombattante FAC	8	4 Exocet	40-70
	11	6	6 Penguin	30
Italy ^a	Maestrale Frigate	1	4 Otomat	60-180
•	Lupo Frigate	4	8 Otomat	60-180
	Sparviero Hydrofoil	3	2 Otomnat	60-180
Netherlands	Tromp Destroyer	2	2 Quad Harpoon	100
•	Kortenaer Frigate	6	2 Quad Harpoon	100
	Van Speijk	6	2 Quad Harpoon	100
Norway	Oslo Frigate	5	6 Penguin	3 0
	Storm FAC	19	1 Penguin	30
	Hauk FAC	14	l Penguin	30
	Snogg FAC	6	l Penguin	30
Turkey	Dogan FAC	4	2 Quad Harpoon	100
	Kartal FAC	9	4 Penguin	30
France	Command Cruiser	1	4 Exocet	40-70
	Suffren Destroyer	2	4 Exocet	40-70
	C-70 Destroyer	3	4 Exocet	40-70
	F-67 Destroyer	3	6 Exocet	40-70
	T-53 Destroyer	1	4 Exocet	40-70
	C-65 Destroyer	1	4 Exocet	40-70
	Riviere Frigate	8	4 Exocet	40-70
	Type A-69 Frigate	8	2 Exocet	40-70
	Trident FAC	4	6 Penguin	30
	LaCombattante	1	4 Penguin	3 0

The Italian Otomat (Teseo) may be capable of a range of 200 km or greater.

Reference: Military Balance 1982/83 and The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, Naval Institute Press, Twelfth Edition, 1981.



2.2.7 Discrimination Between Conventionally-Armed and Nuclear-Armed SLCMs


There appears to be no clear way of distinguishing between conventionally-armed or nuclear-armed SLCMs without some form of on-site inspection including the use of nuclear detectors. And, even with intrusive inspections, it is still possible to circumvent limitations. Further, there will always be a necessary tradeoff between the intrusiveness of the inspection and the amount of technical information about the system inspected that could be compromised (e.g., nuclear or stealth technology).

2.3 POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING OPTIONS


Five possible SLCM negotiating options are analyzed in the study. Each option is discussed individually and assessed. Option 5, Establish Standard Load Requirements, has not been comprehensively analyzed because it requires more detailed information on U.S. and Soviet platforms, missiles, and operational practices than was available. For all options, the SALT II-type rule for launchers was considered to be applicable. The data used to analyze each of the options are provided in the appendix.

2.3.1 Option 1: Limits on the Total Number of SLCM Platforms


In this option, the total number of SLCM platforms would be restricted. The possibilities include (1) an overall limit on the number of platforms with a separate sublimit on long-range platforms and (2) individual limits appeared types of platforms, i.e., surface ships and submarines.




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
2.3.2 Option 2: Limits on Total Number of SLCM-Capable Launchers




2.3.3 Option 3: Limits on Platform Tonnage



^{*} The standard weight is the displacement of the submarine fully loaded and ready for sea but without fuels. This is not the submerged weight.






2.3.5 Option 5: Establish Standard SLCM Load Requirements



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This nominal load limit is analogous to the SALT II limit of 20 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) per B-52. Page 30 is blank. 28